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Abstract
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have been one of
the world's most consistently formidable violent non-state actors over the
last forty years. Unsurprisingly, the group has provided one of the most
compelling and concerning examples of the level of technical
sophistication attainable by sub-state organizations. Over the last two
decades the group has carried out an iterative and innovative process
that, in reaction to improved detection capabilities, has brought them
from depending on disposable go-fast boats to transport drugs to
possessing fully submersible and reusable covert vessels for
transportation. The following case study will discuss the development of
narco-submarines and the underlying motivations behind the pursuit of
this complex engineering task. The case study will outline the different
phases of the narco-submarine development and highlight FARC’s
determination to overcome the challenges present in each design. This
discussion will show how FARC’s systematized acquiring of information
and expertise has resulted in the accomplishment of fully submersible
vessels, capable of transporting more than 10 tons of illicit product.
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Introduction 
Since the early 1980s, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
has found alternate methods to land-based border crossings for the 
transportation of illicit drugs.  These methods evolved from small aircraft 
landings on clandestine airstrips to the use of go-fast boats for delivery along 
the coasts of Mexico and the U.S.  As detection efforts were bolstered in both 
the countries of origin and destination, FARC led a pioneering effort to 
develop a furtive method of transportation that could convey a large amount 
of cocaine to the U.S.  By 1990, FARC had designed and constructed the first 
known “narco-submarine” used for the transportation of drugs.  
 
FARC provides one of the most compelling examples on how violent non-
state actors (VNSAs) use transformational technologies to adapt and 
overcome challenging dynamics.  The innovative capacity of FARC is 
derivative of its blend in ideology, desire for self-sufficiency, financial 
potential and commitment to organizational learning and strength. 1  The 
iterative process in the development of narco-subs by FARC is illustrative of 
the long-term commitment VNSAs with resources can devote to innovative 
projects that facilitate their strategic objectives.  The broader implication 
being that clandestine organizations are willing to undertake complex 
engineering tasks in their efforts to overcome defensive technologies 
implemented by state actors.  Brian Jackson, et al., states that groups like 
these are “acutely aware of government efforts to deploy such 
countermeasures and actively see ways to evade or counteract them.”2 
 
While the development of weapons and the cultivation of other martial 
technologies by state actors have been comprehensively addressed by 
military and technological historians,3 processes of innovation and the 
engagement in complex engineering efforts such as the narco-submarine on 
the part of violent non-state actors remain understudied phenomena.  The 
origin and diffusion of innovations in weapon development, according to 
                                                          
1 Román D. Ortiz, “Renew to Last: Innovation and Strategy of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC)” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the 
Terrorist World (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), pp. 205-222. 
2 Jackson, Brian et.al, Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to 
Overcome Defensive Technologies, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007). 
3 For information on military history and the advent of military technology adoption 
please refer to: Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of 
Hisotry, 1500 to Today, (New York, NY: Gothman Books, 2006); Martin Van Creveld, 
Technology and War: From 2000BC to the Present, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 
1991). 
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Ackerman, has only really blossomed in the past four decades.4  As a result, 
most of the debate in this topic has been limited to conventional warfare 
(within a post-World War II paradigm) and determining to what extent 
technological developments may influence both the onset and outcome of 
war between state actors. 5  As the introduction to this special issue states, 
there remain large gaps in the understanding of the dynamics of VNSA 
innovation in terms of complex engineering tasks, as well as some question 
as to what observable instances of new technology adoption can further 
enrich the understanding of the pursuit of complex engineering efforts by 
groups like FARC.  This historical case study outlines the evolution of an 
initial attempt to construct a narco-submarine.  The adoption of this novel 
technology by FARC analyzes two key aspects important for counter-
smuggling and terrorism efforts: 1) provides relevant data on FARC’s ability 
to engage in a complex effort and 2) takes into account the organizational 
limitations and constraints that may influence the technical capabilities and 
activities of this clandestine organization.  The following sections detail the 
undertaking of this complex engineering effort by FARC in an era where 
technological innovation is no longer a one-sided game.   
 
Narco-submarines,6 also referred to as ‘narco-subs’, are custom-made, self-
propelled maritime vessels intended to smuggle illicit goods to the United 
States from South and/or Central America.7  The earlier designs of narco-
submarines consisted of semi-submersible vessels.  These vessels are capable 
of controlling their running depth but cannot fully submerge.  More recent 
designs include vessels that are submersible.  They are equipped with 
sophisticated radar and navigational technology and are capable of full 
submersion to be virtually undetectable.  These vessels also possess self- 
propulsion capabilities allowing them to travel longer distances. 8   
 
According to a written statement to the Subcommittee on Border and 
Maritime Security House Committee in 2012, maritime drug smuggling 
                                                          
4 Gary A. Ackerman, “More Bang for the Buck: Examining the Determinants of Terrorist 
Adoption of New Weapons Technologies” (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, King’s 
College London 2013). 
5 Ibid. 
6 The term narco-submarines is commonly used to describe all types of vessels (low 
profile vessels, self-propelled semi-submersibles and fully submersibles).  Even though 
the early iterations of the vessels discussed in this study did not have full submersion 
capabilities, this study uses narco-subs to maintain consistency with the sources used.    
7 Robert J. Bunker and Byron Ramirez, “Narco-submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels 
Used for Drug Smuggling Purposes,” Foreign Military Studies Office, May 2014: 9, 
available at: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/Interagency/Narco-
Submarines.pdf. 
8 Ibid.  
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accounted for over 80 percent of the total illicit drug flow from the Andean 
region to Honduras, Mexico and other mid-way transportation regions prior 
to entry into the United States.9  The Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) estimates that approximately 30 percent of the maritime flow utilizes 
narco-submarines.10  Since narco-subs have become increasingly difficult to 
detect and seize due to the sophisticated innovations in radar shielding 
techniques and navigation equipment, the United States continues to have 
little interdiction success. 11  Approximately 74 percent of suspected maritime 
drug trafficking goes unpursued.12   
 
The success of narco-submarines can be attributed to the iterative evolution 
in design and development of the vessels.  The engineering and technology 
employed in the construction of these vessels have improved since the first 
interdiction of a semi-submersible in 1993 near the San Andres Islands in 
Colombia.  By 2011, law enforcement had destroyed construction sites along 
the Colombian Pacific coastline and had seized numerous models and 
versions of these vessels, among them Low Profile Vessels (LPV), Self-
Propelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSS), Submersible/Fully Submersible 
Vessels (FSV) and narco containers/torpedoes.13    
 
Decision 
Craigin, et al., addresses the adoption and diffusion of technology through 
organizational theory and terrorism.  Even though diffusion of technology is 
beyond the scope of this case study, the initial analytical framework of this 
theory is relevant as a counter-veiling example on how terrorist groups make 
the decision to absorb new technology.  The underlying assumption of 
technology diffusion is that “potential users of a new technology will absorb it 
when and if they learn of its existence, as long as barriers to the uptake do not 
exist.”14  Furthermore the theory states the technology will be acquired by the 
                                                          
9 Rear Admiral Charles Michel, Director Joint Interagency Task Force South, “Hearing on 
Border Security Threats to the Homeland: DHS’s Response to Innovative Tactics and 
Technique,” Written statement before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 
Security House Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, June 
19, 2012, 3, available at: https://homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Michel.pdf. 
10 “Inside Cocaine Wars: Narco Sub Mystery,” National Geographic Channel, 2013, 
available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aO3hikt5H3k. 
11 Byron Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel Tactical Note #1,” Small Wars Journal (February 
2014): 1-5. 
12 Rear Admiral Charles Michel, “Hearing on Border Security Threats to the Homeland: 
DHS’s Response to Innovative Tactics and Technique.” 
13 Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel Tactical Note #1.” 
14 Kim Cragin et.al, Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of 
New Technologies, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007). 
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sharing of information between current and new potential users.15  In the case 
of FARC, this is only partially applicable.  FARC had two primary motivations 
behind the decision to undertake this complex engineering effort:  1) to 
counteract improved detection / interdiction efforts and 2) financial gain.  
These drivers have similarly led to the adoption of new techniques by other 
criminal organizations in Colombia.  With the adoption of new radar and 
communications technologies in the 1990s, law enforcement’s detection 
capabilities improved significantly.16  Therefore, the decision to engage in the 
development of narc-submarine vessels was not in fact triggered by the 
availability of this already existing military technology; it was triggered by the 
new challenge it faced with new improved counter-smuggling efforts.   
 
Technology adoption by FARC was an active decision intended to solve the 
group’s current problem.  Technology adoption theory indicates that 
organizations make the active decision to pursue new technology “under 
conditions of uncertainty.”17  Since traditional transportation no longer 
proved effective in the face of these newly acquired law enforcement detection 
capabilities, the use of “innovative logistical tool[s]” was necessary to reduce 
the risk of interdiction and capture.18  Even though the adoption of narco-
submarines was a potential solution to the risk of interdiction, it also 
translated into latent risks of misjudgments about the technology and the 
overall failure of adoption that included all the added costs of the new 
technology and none of the benefits reaped. 19  In spite of these conditions, the 
final decision to undertake the development of narco-subs for FARC was 
motivated by the tactical advantages over other forms of transportation.20 
 
FARC’s decision-making structure is a combination of centralized political 
leadership and decentralized operational units. The centralized leadership 
consists of the general secretariat which provides political direction.21  The 
operational units, however, are decentralized, which allows each unit to 
                                                          
15 Ibid. 
16 Bunker and Ramirez, “Narco-submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels Used for Drug 
Smuggling Purposes.” 
17 Cragin et.al, Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth. 
18 Byron Ramirez, “Narco-Submarines: Applying Advanced Technologies to Drug 
Smuggling,” Small Wars Journal (March 8, 2014): 1-6. 
19 Cragin et.al, Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth. 
20 It is important to note that the motivation was not a tactical move related to their 
political ideology.  Donald B. Davis, “The Submersible Threat to Maritime Homeland 
Security,” (Master Thesis: Naval Postgraduate School, September 2013), available at: 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/37609/13Sep_Davis_Donald.pdf?seq
uence=1. 
21 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Origins and Development of the Guerillas in Colombian 
Labyrinth (Arlington: Rand, 2001). 
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operate with autonomy and focus on specialized activities.  Specifically, the 
organization is divided into six different commands, each composed of at 
least five fronts that represent different geographic territories.22  The Joint 
Western Command, the most profit-driven and least politically inclined bloc 
of FARC, claims responsibility for most of the group’s semi-submersible 
operations in the Pacific region.23  Economic activities led by the Joint 
Western Command results in approximately 65 percent of the group’s total 
revenue.24  
 
The level of participation by each front in the decision-making process to 
adopt the development of narco-subs is unknown.  However, given the 
organizational structure discussed above, the decision to first engage in this 
activity most likely involved the central leadership of FARC.  Both the general 
secretariat, the ultimate deciding body of the organization, and the Joint 
Western Command, were thus most likely actively involved and provided 
approval in the initial pursuit of this new venture.  
 
It had become evident by the late 1990s that other sea and air-based methods 
lacked the ability to carry large quantities of drugs in a single shipment and 
there had been a series of interdictions of vessels belonging to FARC.25 
Moreover, ground transportation resulted in lengthy, high-risk trips while go-
fast boats had a 50 percent interdiction rate.26  Furthermore, FARC’s 
traditional methods for counteracting modern detection capabilities and 
facilitate narcotics operations, which included bribery and/or coercion of 
officials, concealment of merchandise in cargo containers, and use of 
underground tunnels, became less attractive as the possibility of carrying larger 
quantities in narco-submarines became available.   
                                                          
22 Ibid.  
23 The Joint Western Command controls numerous fronts in the southern and 
midwestern areas of Colombia.  
24 Armando Hernandez, Rick A. Galeano, and Mario Escobar, “The Semi-submersible 
Network,” (Master Thesis: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2012), available at: 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/27844/12Dec_Hernandez_Galeano_
Escobar.pdf?sequence=1. 
25 “Colombia halla ‘narcosubmarino’ supuestamente de FARC en frontera con Ecuador,” 
El Universo, Octuber 2014, available at: 
http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2014/10/22/nota/4135331/colombia-halla-
narcosubmarino-supuestamente-farc-frontera-ecuador. 
26 Ivan P. Arias Vergara, “Inspeccion, Analisis, Trabajos de Completamiento y 
Reflotamiento del Primer Narcosumergible Encontrado en el Ecuador,” (Master Thesis: 
ESPOL, 2013), available at: 
https://www.dspace.espol.edu.ec/bitstream/123456789/25046/1/INFORME%20NARC
OSUBMARINO%20IVAN%20ARIAS.pdf; Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel Tactical Note #1; 
“Colombian Narcosubs,” Vice.com, February 15, 2011, available at 
http://www.vice.com/video/colombian-narcosubs. 
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As a result, Narco-subs became an increasingly frequent method of covert 
transportation for FARC by the early 2000s.27  Even though authorities have 
not been able to attribute the construction of these submersibles to a specific 
front or obtain information regarding the decision-making process, it can be 
presumed that each operational unit (if more than one is involved) has the 
capability and discretion to decide when to engage in the development of 
narco-subs in its territory.  The fronts in the southern pacific border of 
Colombia28 are more likely to make this decision, given that the difficult 
terrain and mangroves of the region provide the traffickers with the ideal 
conditions to establish rudimentary construction sites that are difficult for law 
enforcement to reach and have access to the sea.  Regardless of the autonomy 
provided by the decentralized structure, however, the high estimated costs for 
construction of the vessels as well as the large quantity of shipments intended 
to be carried, likely required at least some coordination between central 
leadership and operational units, in order to disburse the resources and 
schedule transportation of the illicit product to open-sea loading areas.29    
 
According to the testimonies of incarcerated narco-sub crew members, 
decision making at sea is made remotely by the leader of the front, who in 
turn receives guidance from the Joint Western Command.  For example, if a 
vessel were to suffer interdiction, the captain of the submersible is 
responsible for immediately notifying the leader of his front via satellite 
communication, who then must give the order to sink and/or abandon the 
vessel.30  This system is partially attributed to the overall checks and balances 
instituted by FARC’s central leadership to keep tabs on drug profits as well as 
each front’s operating procedures.    
 
Even though risk about the decision-making process of adopting a new 
technology is addressed above, the risk assumed during the process of 
innovation can also provide an important perspective of the criminal 
                                                          
27 Ramirez, “Narco-Submarines: Applying Advanced Technologies to Drug Smuggling.” 
28 Erich C. Saumeth, “Narco-Semi-Sumergibles y Sumergibles,” Universidad de Federal 
de Juiz de Fora, 2011, available at: http://www.ecsbdefesa.com.br/defesa/fts/NSS.pdf. 
29 Loading of the illicit product was usually carried out in the open sea.  The added weight 
of the shipment would not allow the vessel to navigate outside the construction estuaries 
if the drugs were loaded at this location. “Colombian Narcosubs,” Vice.com.  
30 Acccording to Colombian law, if there is no evidence of illicit activities (no product is 
found), the interdiction becomes a rescue mission and the drug traffickers cannot be 
prosecuted. Vergara, “Inspeccion, Analisis, Trabajos de Completamiento y Reflotamiento 
del Primer Narcosumergible Encontrado en el Ecuador;” “Narcosubmarinos,” Discovery 
Channel, 2010, available at: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xw6h6n_discovery-
channel-narcosubmarinos_tech. 
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organization’s behavior.  Open source literature does not make direct 
reference to the risk tolerance of FARC during the development of the narco-
subs, however the group is widely known to engage in dangerous operations 
while operating in a high-risk environment.  Previous activities have 
demonstrated that the organization does not shy away from innovation.  For 
example, the group reached out to the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA) to receive training in the use of explosives,31 it has dabbled in the 
potential trafficking of RN materials,32 and has engaged in violent behavior, 
including the kidnapping high-level officials and keeping prisoners for 
leverage in negotiations.33  Despite FARC’s penchant for high-risk 
confrontation, in the case of the narco-subs, the group appears to have 
attempted to minimize risk and has successfully mitigated interdiction by 
selecting clandestine locations for construction; the sites are on shallow-river 
systems, difficult for law enforcement to transverse, and with vast mangroves 
providing necessary camouflage.34 
 
FARC’s development of narco-subs has constituted a long-term endeavor in 
terms of planning and execution.  After the initial decision to pursue the 
development of narco-subs, FARC continued to innovate and improve on the 
initial designs.  This became evident to law enforcement during seizures.  The 
evolution of the vessels proceeded from rudimentary designs to sophisticated 
aerodynamic vessels equipped with telecommunication systems.35  According 
to a former drug-trafficker, “Looking back, it appears to be that the 
Colombian cartel was honing their skills in preparation for their ultimate 
goal—the construction of a long-distance vessel that could dive and surface on 
command.”36  The implication is that the evolution of the vessels and the 
immediate benefits from successful smuggling trips using the early designs 
serviced the long-term technical and developmental goals of the group.  It is 
                                                          
31 Andy Oppenheimer, “How terrorists acquire technology and training: lessons from the 
IRA,” New Security Learning, 2009, available at: 
http://www.newsecuritylearning.com/index.php/feature/123-how-terrorists-acquire-
technology-and-training-lessons-from-the-ira. 
32 “El Uranio de las FARC,” El Espectador, 2008, available at: 
http://www.elespectador.com/impreso/cuadernilloa/judicial/articuloimpreso-el-
uranio-de-farc 
33 “Las FARC liberan rehenes y piden cambiar reglas del proceso de paz,” El Observador, 
2014, available at: http://www.elobservador.com.uy/las-farc-liberan-rehenes-y-piden-
cambiar-reglas-del-proceso-paz-n293141 
34 Armando Hernandez, Rick A. Galeano, and Mario Escobar, “The Semi-submersible 
Network.” 
35 “Colombian Narcosubs,” Vice.com.  
36 Jim Popkin, “Authorities in Awe of Drug Runners’ Jungle-Built Kevlar-Coated 
Supersubs,” Wired.com, 2011, available at: 
http://www.wired.com/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/1. 
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evident from this timeline and evolution in design that FARC did in fact invest 
in a long-term development program to optimize its narco-subs’ designs.   
 
The initial investment in this new technology was expected be extremely 
high.37  FARC invested significant financial and human resources to develop 
and improve designs.  According to a report released by the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Colombian National Police, some narco-
sub crew members have been graduate engineers of SENA (the National 
Learning Service) in Colombia.38  It remains unclear, however, whether these 
experts were sent expressly to acquire the necessary skills for this engineering 
feat or received this training before engaging with the organization.  “This 
ability to invest and take on long-term, high-value projects is a warning of the 
traffickers’ high level of resources and organization.”39  This commitment also 
signals an overarching aptitude for organizational learning, which is evident 
in the practices surrounding the decision-making process and later on in the 
implementation phases of the adoption of this new technology.  FARC’s 
openness and willingness to learn from study and experience alike allowed 
the group to spread tactical and operational knowledge to its members and 
also enabled them to identify their most apt followers for the development of 
this technology.40  The evident change in behavior and modification of 
operational practices that resulted as a response to this new knowledge and 
experience could have facilitated the decision and adoption of this new long-
term strategic objective and investment.41  
 
Indeed, the amount invested in the construction and development was 
negligible in comparison to the profits expected from the drug sales per 
shipment.42  It is estimated that the cost of construction of a vessel capable of 
transporting eight tons of narcotics is less than 2 million dollars with a net 
return of over $200 million. 43  There have also been reports that FARC sold or 
                                                          
37 Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel Tactical Note #1.” 
38 Ana Maria Saavedra, “La tecnologia de los submarinos al servicio del narcotráfico,” El 
Pais, 2011, available at: http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/nautilus-
servicio-mafia. 
39 Hannah Stone, “Rawfeed: The Evolution of the Drug Submarine,” InSight Crime, 2011, 
available at: http://insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-evolution-of-the-drug-
submarine. 
40  Michael Kenney. “How Terrorists Learn” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical 
Learning in the Terrorist World (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), pp. 
33-51. 
41 Kenney, Michael, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, 
Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation (University Park, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). 
42 Ramirez, “Narco-Submarines: Applying Advanced Technologies to Drug Smuggling.” 
43 Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel Tactical Note #1.” 
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rented narco-subs and their designs to other collaborating organizations 
which not only diversified FARC’s source of income but also increased its 
margin of profit.44  This latter point illustrates the broader implication of the 
development of this new technology and how it may facilitate smuggling 
efforts for criminal organizations, not only for other violent non-state actors 
in Colombia, but potentially in Mexico as well.  
 
Implementation 
Reports indicate that the Joint Western Command of FARC is responsible for 
most of the organization’s semi-submersible operations.45  Even though the 
precise role played by the operational units remains unclear to authorities, 
individuals who have been arrested have revealed that narco-sub operations 
are carefully carried out by a tactical team, assumed to be in close 
coordination with the leadership.  Construction camps established in the 
southern Pacific coastline consist of approximately 30 low-level members 
responsible for securing the campsite and carrying material, as well as the 
technicians responsible for building the vessel.46  Additionally, the 
organization is also known to have used and hosted Russian, Sri Lankan, and 
Pakistani naval engineers to assist in the design and construction of narco-
submarines, not only demonstrating their commitment to the adoption of this 
new technology but also taking advantage of technological diffusion47 across 
actors.48 Additional reports from the Colombian National Police state that the 
group may have occasionally subcontracted out construction of the 
submersibles to a professional service unaware of what the ultimate purpose 
of the vessels was.49 Authorities have also discovered that the construction 
process is carried out across several phases, involving different locations and 
different subcontractors. 50  
 
Not all those involved in construction and deployment of the vessels do so on 
a voluntary basis, however.  In 2008, Colombian authorities interdicted a 
vessel with four crew members.51  These individuals, who had been previously 
                                                          
44 Kirk Semple, “The Submarine Next Door,” New York Times, 2000, available at: 
http://partners.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20001203mag-semple.html. 
45 Hernandez, Galeano, and Escobar, “The Semi-submersible Network.” 
46 “Colombian Narcosubs,” Vice.com.  
47 Cragin et.al, Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth. 
48 Vergara, “Inspeccion, Analisis, Trabajos de Completamiento y Reflotamiento del 
Primer Narcosumergible Encontrado en el Ecuador;” Ramirez, “Colombian Cartel 
Tactical Note #1;” Armando Hernandez, Rick A. Galeano, and Mario Escobar, “The Semi-
submersible Network.” 
49 Semple, “The Submarine Next Door.” 
50 Saumeth, “Narco-Semi-Sumergibles y Sumergibles.” 
51 Ana Maria Saavedra, “La tecnologia de los submarinos al servicio del narcotráfico.” 
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identified as trained naval engineers, 52 informed authorities that they had 
been kidnapped and taken to one of these sites and were coerced into 
collaborating in the construction of a vessel.53  
 
The areas of expertise and knowledge required for the development of narco-
submarines include technical design and construction (i.e., engineers, 
welders, electricians, fiberglass installers), experts in maritime equipment 
(primarily for navigation), and experienced seafarers to serve as 
crewmembers.54  With the rapid evolution in the sophistication of narco-subs, 
the level of technical expertise required naturally increased.55  The need for 
naval engineers and trained navigators has pushed FARC to seek out experts 
from the Colombian navy, offering large sums of money in exchange for their 
skills.  According to Roman Ortiz, FARC’s ability to recruit university students 
and send members to higher education institutions across the country to 
study science and engineering, exponentially increases its potential for 
technological sophistication.56 FARC’s notable capacity for learning is evident 
through its training camps and programs that often provide members with 
information on how to utilize new weapons and become familiar with guerilla 
warfare tactics. 57  Additionally, the group has not shied away from using 
violence and coercion, forcing individuals with the needed skillsets to assist 
them in the development of the narco-subs, as described above and testified 
to by arrested group members.58  
 
The complexity of narco-sub technology has inherent limitations and risks 
which FARC had to face during the implementation phase.  The successful 
adoption of this new technology was dependent on the characteristics of the 
technology itself and the ability of FARC to absorb the knowledge required to 
build and operate the vessels.  According to Cragin, in order for the new 
technology to be effective, the implementing organization must have the 
“appropriate knowledge to use the technology successfully.” 59  As discussed 
above, FARC diversified the acquisition of technology through explicit 
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knowledge (e.g. design drawings of vessels) and tacit-knowledge60 (e.g. “how-
to” skills), many times achieved through coercion, deceit, or bribery.  FARC’s 
ability to absorb explicit and tacit knowledge has been evident through past 
operations and collaborations with other criminal organizations.  For 
example, in 1997 FARC sought out explosive expertise from the PIRA to 
further promote its ideological causes through urban terrorism.61  The 
stalemate between the Colombian government and the group placed an 
enormous amount of pressure on the leadership, which had not been able to 
move forward with the group’s demands.  As a result, there was a change in 
strategy that required more weapons and explosive technologies.  FARC 
requested the assistance of PIRA, who excelled in the use of sophisticated 
mortars and other weapons.  It was not long after that three mortar-bomb 
experts from PIRA were brought to Colombia to train FARC members.62  The 
strategic acquisition of knowledge from other groups for FARC is a viable and 
relatively easy solution considering their network and resources.    
 
When it comes to collaboration with external entities for the development of 
the narco-subs, early reports do indicate that the Cartel Norte del Valle might 
have been the organization that initially came up with the idea of narco-subs; 
however, this group did not have the resources or skills to act on it.63  The 
majority of sources indicate that FARC has primary control over the 
development of narco-subs in Colombia.  However, authorities believe that 
with the numbers of narco-subs suspected of being in operation ballooning, it 
is likely that FARC is not the only drug trafficking organization (DTO) 
involved in this kind of enterprise.64  It is important to note that, even though 
Colombian authorities have evidence of collaboration between Colombian and 
Central American DTOs in smuggling operations, no direct connection has 
been made with regard to any collaboration on narco-sub development.   
                                                          
60 Classes of knowledge adapted from Jeffrey L. Cummings, Knowledge Transfer Across 
R&D Units: An Empirical Investigation of the Factors Affecting Successful Knowledge 
Transfer Across Intra- and Inter-Organizational Units, unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Washington, D.C.: School of Business and Public Management, George 
Washington University, (2002); Gunnar Hedlund, “A Model of Knowledge Management 
and the N-Form Corporation,” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15 (Special Issue), 
Strategy: Search for New Paradigms, 1994; Rogers, Everett M., Diffusion of Innovations 
(New York, NY: The Free Press, 1995) and Bernard Simonin, “Ambiguity and the Process 
of Knowledge Exchange in Strategic Alliances,” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 20, 
No. 7, 1999. 
61 Martin Hodgson, Henry McDonald, and Peter Beaumont, “IRA Blunder in the Jungle 
Sparks US Rage,” The Observer, August 19, 2001, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/aug/19/northernireland.ireland. 
62 Jeremy McDermott, “Colombian Attacks ‘Have Hallmark of IRA,’” BBC News, August 
11, 2002, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2186244.stm. 
63 “Narcosubmarinos,” Discovery Channel. 
64 Ibid. 
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With regard to other sources of collaboration, authorities have reported the 
use of professionalized services (individuals and/or groups) that are not 
linked to drug trafficking networks.  For example, there is one known civilian 
contributor that has assisted in the crafting of narco-subs–Enrique 
Portocarrero aka “Captain Nemo.”65  He has designed and built as many as 
“20 fiberglass submarines, designed to resemble sea creatures, for drug 
traffickers to haul cocaine from Southern Colombia to Central America and 
Mexico.”66  
 
FARC is known to have meticulously maintained operational security during 
the development of narco-subs.  To avoid detection, workers completed much 
of the construction of these vehicles under the protection of thick jungle 
canopy.67  The daily tidal fluctuations of the mangroves also limit and prohibit 
access via boat.68  In addition, “local muscle” armed with automatic rifles and 
grenades provided increased security.69  FARC members are also known to 
have preventative measures in place to avoid prosecution in the case of an 
interdiction at sea.70  
 
In terms of safety of the crew members, the group has been less cautious. 
FARC lacked concern for the well-being and safety of the personnel involved 
in the construction and journey phases.  The treacherous environment of the 
mangroves entailed poor living conditions in construction sites. 71  
Furthermore, the subs themselves are known to have had extremely cramped 
living quarters.72  Crewmen traveled long distances with limited food and 
                                                          
65 Watkins, Lance J., Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles: The Next Great Threat To 
Regional Security and Stability. Naval Postgraduate School, 2011, available at: 
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66 Watkins, Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles: The Next Great Threat To Regional 
Security and Stability.  
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68 Ibid.  
69 Jim Popkin,  “The High Seas: How a high school-educated drug smuggler built a fleet of 
submarines–in the middle of the jungle–to ferry cocaine to the United States,” Slate, 
2013, available at: 
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#1;” Hernandez, Galeano, and Escobar, “The Semi-submersible Network.” 
72 “Colombian Narcosubs,” Vice.com. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/6
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1509
61 
 
without sleep or running water.  While inside the narco-subs, they were 
confined to a loud capsule often filled with engine fumes.73  Finally, in the 
case of an impending interdiction, the front leader would often willingly sink 
the vessel, leaving the crewmembers adrift at sea.74 
 
Appendix A provides a detailed description and images of the historical 
evolution of the narco-submarines.  The following section describes the 
general construction process from start to finish of the most complex vessel 
developed: the submarine.   
 
Experts have divided the evolution of the design of the submersible vessels 
into three distinct phases:  
 
1. 1992-2004: This phase consisted of experimentation through trial and 
error.  The vessels were constructed using fiberglass material and were 
usually between 30 to 50 feet in length.  
 
2. 2005-2006: This phase reflected rapid prototyping with increased 
capability and the use of self-propelled technologies. Vessels 
incorporated wood to the fiberglass previously used and varied in 
range and capacity.   
 
3. 2007 to the present: This current phase incorporates mature designs 
and greater standardization.75  The vessels are faster and have a higher 
carrying and storage capacity.  Some designs include the use of steel 
with specialized lead shielding to avoid detectors.  Additionally, these 
vessels incorporate the use of advanced navigation systems, GPS and 
other anti-radar features. 76    
 
Overall, the emphasis FARC placed on research and development resulted in 
a series of improvements, ranging from semi-submersibles intended only to 
last one trip to submarines with sophisticated navigation equipment and 
                                                          
73 “Narcosubmarinos,” Discovery Channel. 
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communication technologies capable of transporting over eight tons of 
material and making numerous trips.77  
 
According to numerous sources, the first step in the construction process is to 
identify a location to carry out the construction of the vessel.  The location is 
selected based upon the feasibility of the site for bringing in construction 
materials via the river systems, accessibility to the ocean, and ability to 
operate covertly throughout the construction process.  Thick mangrove 
vegetation provides an excellent cover for construction sites and is difficult for 
law enforcement to patrol due to its sheer density.78  Building submersible 
sites close to the ocean is also a prerequisite because, upon completion, these 
underwater vehicles must have a navigable route downstream to estuaries 
where they can begin their voyage into the Pacific Ocean.79  Typically, these 
vessels are built near the Pacific coastline of Colombia, in or near the regions 
of Sanquianga and Buenaventura.80   
 
Concurrent with the identification of the construction site, personnel are 
selected according to their expertise.  Following the fulfillment of these two 
requisite goals, the initial infrastructure needed for the construction effort is 
built.  The materials needed for the sites are transported via river systems 
along the pacific coastline of Colombia.  These rivers are only accessible at 
certain times of the day, depending on tidal cycles.81  According to the 
testimony of detainees (predominantly naval engineers), the construction is 
carried out in phases.82  The exact process of construction remains largely 
unknown to authorities, however, many of the seized vessels have been 
evaluated and experts claim that the methods used to construct the narco-
subs are organized, compartmentalized and specialized.83  In one instance, a 
vessel captured in the northern region of Ecuador was evaluated within the 
framework of the expanded ship work break structure (ESWBS).84  Through 
                                                          
77 Bunker and Ramirez, “Narco-submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels Used for Drug 
Smuggling Purposes,” 12. 
78 Ibid. 
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80 Ibid. 
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this evaluation, it became evident that the vessel’s construction had followed 
similar guidelines; shining light on the sophisticated nature of the systems, 
not only in the vessel and its construction, but also the procedures and 
planning that had been undertaken.85  Even though it is unclear whether this 
formal framework is used at all construction sites, it has provided authorities 
with a blueprint of the general process of construction of narco-subs.    
 
General Construction Process86 
Process Description 
General 
Hull 
Structure 
 Construction of the main hull and all the structural 
divisions (bulkheads), platforms, frame 
reinforcements of the bow and stern, and bases for 
equipment.   
 Welding of all compartments and unions, ballast 
tanks, masts, service platforms, trapdoors and 
cabins.   
Propulsion 
Plant 
 Installation of energy converters, propulsion gears, 
twin engines, generators, cooling and fuel systems, 
oil services, and water recycling systems.   
General 
Electric 
Plant  
 Backup generators and air conditioning systems 
(when available).  The overall electric source and 
conduits that provide power to all the systems.   
Command 
and 
Surveillance 
 Installation of satellite, radar, sonar, GPS (and 
overall communication) technologies.   
Auxiliary 
System  
 Installation of systems that provide fresh water, and 
lubrication.  (This system is only occasionally 
included as it is primarily to provide comfort to 
crewmembers.) 
Outfit and 
Furnishings 
  Paint jobs, stowage, working spaces, living quarters.   
Armament  None. The storage spaces traditionally designated for 
armaments serve as additional room for narcotics 
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and other illicit goods being transported by the 
vessel.  
Integration 
and 
Engineering  
 Training of crewmembers, inspections, trials, 
schematics.  Processes to ensure the viability of the 
trip.   
 
Recent vessel seizures illustrate further evolution in narco-sub design 
capabilities.  In contrast to the early semi-submersible vessels found in 
Colombia, fully submersible vessels have been found since 2011 that are 30 
meters long and three meters wide, and “can carry four crew members in an 
air-conditioned interior, which even features a small galley.  Perhaps most 
importantly, it can carry eight tons of cocaine, dive eight meters underwater, 
and make the long voyage to the coast of Mexico with only a periscope 
remaining above the surface.”87 
 
The implementation process was not without hurdles, however.  The group 
faced different obstacles throughout the evolution of the narco-subs.  Initially, 
they encountered flaws in design, essentially utilizing the basic go-fast boat 
structure with a wraparound hull.  Even though these vessels resulted in a 
higher rate of successful trips (predominantly due to the vessel’s camouflage 
at sea), these semi-submersibles were still detectable by air because they 
could not fully submerge.  Additionally, due to design constraints and 
inexperience in this engineering feat, vessels could only be used once and 
could not carry more than 2 to 4 tons.88  Regarding more sophisticated 
designs, the group took over twenty years to perfect the fully submersible 
model.  FARC’s perseverance is evident, as it did not abandon efforts to build 
a fully submersible vessel.  The main obstacles to achieving the most recent 
design had to do with acquiring the necessary expertise to incorporate the 
most complex systems utilized by these vessels.  These included systems 
related to the full submersion capability and satellite communications 
systems.  Additionally, many of these systems had to be manufactured in-
house, which extended the construction time period.89 
 
Analysis and Conclusion 
While the main motivations behind the decision to develop narco-subs are 
described above, it is important to point out why FARC made the decision to 
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construct these vessels in-house and to continue pursuing this technology 
despite the difficulties.  The reasons FARC undertook this complex 
engineering effort therefore include: 
 
1. Avoiding Detection–As an illicit enterprise, FARC seeks to remain 
clandestine.  As such, the adoption of narco-subs prolonged its ability 
to operate under the radar.  This is especially true now that FARC has 
successfully constructed fully submersible vessels, which are almost 
impossible to detect.90 The adoption of GPS and satellite technology by 
Colombian law enforcement dramatically improved smuggling 
detection efforts.  To counteract this, the group invested in engineering 
and technological measures to persist and keep the competitive 
advantage in drug smuggling.91 
 
2. Profit–The organization is profit-driven, which is one of the key 
reasons why narco-subs in particular were selected.  As previously 
mentioned, the cost to construct these vessels was low relative to the 
profit gained from successful smuggling journeys.  Colombian 
authorities estimate that with one successful trip with a vessel carrying 
seven tons of cocaine, FARC would earn approximately $175 million 
dollars.92    
 
3. Long-term Development–Evidence suggests that, in spite of the 
obstacles present in this complex engineering task, FARC persevered 
in acquiring a true narco-sub capability because it foresaw the 
advantages of eventually succeeding in having a fleet of fully functional 
submarines.  FARC was prepared to tolerate setbacks along the way in 
order to achieve this ultimate goal. Moreover, as designs evolved, the 
vessels increased in storage capacity, thus increasing the profit margin 
of each trip. 
 
The organization ultimately succeeded in its goal of acquiring fully 
submersible vessels.  This can be attributed primarily to: 
 
1. Financial and human resources–The group invested vast resources 
over the span of 20 years to perfect the submersible design. FARC’s 
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resources facilitated the acquisition of the necessary skills and 
materials (albeit sometimes by using coercion).   
 
2. Influence–The dominant influence of FARC in the areas where the 
development of the narco-subs occurred highly impacted the success 
of this engineering task.  This provided the group with access to 
individuals with the necessary skills, ranging from members of the 
Colombian navy to local fishermen.  In addition, the Joint Western 
Command instilled fear in neighboring towns and villages.  
Surrounding populations were warned against discussing the nature of 
the Command’s operations with authorities. 93  As a result, activities 
carried on more smoothly and with less chance of discovery.   
 
3. Safe Havens–The areas of operation along the Pacific coastline of the 
numerous fronts engaged in the construction of the narco-subs are 
largely beyond the reach of Colombian authorities.  This contributed to 
the successful development of the narco-subs because construction 
was allowed to continue without disruption.   
 
4. Culture of learning–FARC’s organizational learning capabilities were 
exceptional.  The time and effort that were devoted to each member’s 
training and schooling exhibited a wide spectrum of learning that 
facilitated the trial and error approach during the development phases 
of the narc-submarines.  FARC undertook several development phases, 
each of which built on the phases that had gone before.  This iterative 
process absorbed lessons learned in each phase to improve the next, 
ultimately leading to the successful development of a fully submersible 
vessel. 
 
FARC’s evolution since 2006, or some might even argue devolution in 
ideology and the improvement in Colombia’s security environment, created a 
challenging context for VNSA technological innovation.94  After the 9/11 
attacks, the international security arena changed.  As international criminal 
and terrorist groups were targeted by law enforcement, FARC suffered 
financial losses, leadership arrests, and desertion.  Nevertheless, the group 
has continued to develop narco-submarines as demonstrated through their 
last standardization and maturity phase in 2007.  Even though the adoption 
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of this new technology was intended to facilitate drug transportation, the 
designs of the vessels themselves are now an in-house capability and new 
commodity which FARC can communicate to other criminal or terrorist 
organizations for the right price in these times of need.  The diffusion of 
narco-submarine technology to other criminal or terrorist groups is of 
concern to counter-smuggling and terrorism efforts in the region, particularly 
if the vessels were to be used for more nefarious purposes than drug 
trafficking.  This illustrates how technology adoption and diffusion intended 
to facilitate operations can itself become yet another stand-alone resource for 
terrorists and potential collaborators.   
 
The mixed nature of FARC’s ideology, coupled with its openness for ideas and 
vast resources, provides a fascinating example of how violent non-state actors 
explore innovative technologies to overcome challenging dynamics.  FARC’s 
need for strategic autonomy bolstered the group’s desire for innovation.  This 
fear of dependency molded the organizational norms, as well as decision-
making processes and practices, gearing them towards self-sufficiency in all 
their operations.   The iterative process in the development of narco-subs is 
demonstrative of the long-term commitment VNSAs with resources can 
devote to innovative projects that facilitate their long-term strategic 
objectives.  
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95 Table extracted from Bunker and Ramirez, “Narco-submarines: Specially Fabricated 
Vessels Used for Drug Smuggling Purposes.” 
Appendix A. Evolution of the Narco-Sub (1970s-Present)95 
Years Phase Description 
1970s 
through 
early 
1990s 
Go-fast boats 
 
Fiberglass material. Deep “V” 
offshore racing hull - usually 
30 to 50 feet (10 to 15 m) 
long, narrow in beam, and 
equipped with two or more 
powerful engines, often with 
more than 1,000 combined 
horsepower. The boats can 
typically travel at speeds over 
80 knots (150 km/h) in calm 
waters, over 50 knots (90 
km/h) in choppy waters, and 
maintain 25 knots (47 km/h) 
in the average five to seven 
foot (1.5 to 2 m).  
Early 
1990s 
through 
2004 
‘Narco-sub’ Experimentation 
Phase 
 
Fiberglass and wood; low 
horse power engines; Many 
different designs used; 
Limited in range and 
capacity. 
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2005 - 
2006 
‘Narco-sub’ Prototyping Phase 
[semi-submersibles] 
 
 
Similar vessels seized [semi-
submersibles]; Increased 
engine power; increased 
capabilities such as greater 
stealth, better operational 
performance, and increased 
speed and size; Introduction 
of low-profile vessels (LPVs). 
2007 - 
present 
‘Narco-sub’ Standardization and 
Maturity Phase 
 
Faster (up to 11 mph); Some 
made from steel; Capable of 
carrying bigger loads of drugs 
than earlier models; Two-
diesel engines; Engines up to 
350 hp; Upper lead 
shielding; Advanced 
navigation systems; GPS; 
Anti-radar features; water-
cooled mufflers. 
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